On the Relation of the Laws of Thermodynamics to Statistical Mechanics by Myrvold, Wayne C.
On the Relation of the Laws of
Thermodynamics to Statistical Mechanics
Wayne C. Myrvold
Department of Philosophy




Much of the philosophical literature on the relations between ther-
modynamics and statistical mechanics has to do with the process of
relaxation to equilibrium. There has been comparatively little discus-
sion of how to obtain what have traditionally been recognized as laws
of thermodynamics, the zeroth, first, and second laws, from statisti-
cal mechanics. This note is about how to obtain analogues of those
laws as theorems of statistical mechanics. The difference between the
zeroth and second laws of thermodynamics and their statistical me-
chanical analogues is that the statistical mechanical laws are proba-
bilistically qualified; what the thermodynamical laws say will happen,
their statistical mechanical analogues say will probably happen. For
this reason, it is entirely appropriate — indeed, virtually inevitable —
for the quantities that are statistical mechanical analogues of temper-
ature and entropy to be attributes of probability distributions. I close
with some remarks about the relations between so-called “Gibbsian”
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1 Introduction
This note is about the relations between statistical mechanics and the laws of
thermodynamics, and how analogues of the laws of the thermodynamics may
be obtained from statistical mechanics. None of the results to be discussed
are new, but it seems that how it is that one obtains analogues of the laws
of thermodynamics, and what these analogues are, are matters that are not
as widely appreciated in philosophical discussions of the relations between
the two theories as they should be. Furthermore, textbooks of statistical
mechanics do not always lay things out as clearly as could be.
I speak of obtaining analogues of the laws of thermodynamics from sta-
tistical mechanics. The reason for this is that (as Maxwell was the first to
clearly articulate), the kinetic theory of heat entails that the laws of thermo-
dynamics, as originally conceived, cannot be strictly true. Thermodynamic
states are characterized by a small number of macroscopically ascertainable
parameters, and, once it is accepted that the systems treated of in thermody-
namics consist of a vast number of molecules, it must be admitted that the
parameters used to characterize a thermodynamic state determine at best
a minuscule fraction of the full degrees of freedom of a system, and that a
specification of these parameters is not even remotely close to being sufficient
for determining, on the basis of the dynamical laws of the system alone, the
subsequent behaviour of the system. Moreover, there is no feasible way to
prepare a system in such a way as to rule out microstates that will lead to
deviations from the behaviour prescribed by the laws of thermodynamics.
The founders of statistical mechanics concluded that macroscopically ob-
servable departures from the laws of thermodynamics are not to be thought
impossible, but, at best, extremely improbable within the regime in which
thermodynamics is empirically successful.
The statistical mechanical analogues of the laws of thermodynamics must,
therefore, be probabilistically qualified statements. This means that we will
have to make sense of probabilistic talk. How to make sense of probabilities
in physics is, of course, the subject of substantial philosophical literature.
We will not delve into this topic here; as long as sense can be made of prob-
abilistically qualified assertions, this will serve our purpose. A caveat is in
order, however. There have been attempts to construe probabilistic asser-
tions about a physical system as involving implicit reference to some actual
or hypothetical ensemble of systems, a view that is known as frequentism,
and which was on the rise at the time that Boltzmann introduced the use of
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ensembles of similarly prepared systems into the literature on statistical me-
chanics. Though a frequentist view of probability continues to be espoused
by many physicists, in the philosophical literature on interpretations of prob-
ability there seems to be, more or less, a consensus that frequentism is not a
viable view of the meaning of probabilistic statements (see La Caze 2016 and
Myrvold 2021a, §3.2 for discussion). Though probabilistic judgments may be
informed by multiple experiments performed on similarly prepared systems,
we should not conflate the evidence for statements of probability with their
meaning.1
For the purposes of this note, it won’t matter whether the mechanics un-
derlying our statistical mechanics is classical or quantum.2 There’s a reason
for this. We’ll be concerned, not with the full set of degrees of freedom of a
physical system, but with a restricted set of macrovariables (and indeed, we’ll
be mostly concerned with one macrovariable, energy, and its transfer between
systems). The restriction of a pure quantum state to a set of commuting ob-
servables is (unless it’s joint eigenstate of those observables) a mixed state,
and, as far as those observables are concerned, acts like a classical probability
distribution.3
The fact that, on the kinetic theory of heat, the laws of thermodynamics
cannot be strictly true, has consequences for the concepts of thermodynamics
that are not often emphasized. The zeroth law of thermodynamics is a pre-
supposition of the definition of temperature; that the law hold is a necessary
condition for the existence of a function T of the physical states of systems,
equal values of which indicate that there will be no net heat exchange be-
tween systems placed in thermal contact. In a regime in which deviations
from the zeroth law cannot be neglected, there can be no such function. The
second law of thermodynamics is a presupposition of the definition of ther-
modynamic entropy; the law is a necessary condition for the existence of a
function S of the physical state of the system that satisfies the definition of
1For discussion of what sense can be made of probabilistic assertions in the context of
statistical mechanics, see Myrvold (2016) and Ch. 8 of Myrvold (2021a).
2This is not to say that the differences between classical and quantum mechanics don’t
matter at all to thermodynamics. It’s just that the derivations of the laws of thermody-
namics that are the subject of this note are valid in both classical and quantum mechanics.
3Can all probabilities in statistical mechanics, even classical statistical mechanics, be
thought of as quantum probabilities? This is an interesting question. An affirmative
answer has been argued for by David Wallace (2016). For the purposes of this note, we
can remain non-committal on this question.
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thermodynamic entropy. In a regime in which deviations from the second law
cannot be neglected, there can be no such function. One might, nevertheless,
seek to define statistical mechanical analogues of temperature and entropy,
that play roles, in the statistical mechanical analogues of the laws of ther-
modynamics, that parallel the roles played in the laws of thermodynamics
by their thermodynamic counterparts.
We should expect to obtain from statistical mechanics analogues of the
laws of thermodynamics that, in an appropriate regime, yield assertions
that closely approximate the laws of thermodynamics.4 The fact that the
statistical-mechanical analogues of the laws of thermodynamics are to be
couched in probabilistic terms, whereas the laws of thermodynamics are not,
is a clue as to how this will go. It is a familiar fact that, under suitable
conditions, usually ones that involve some version of the weak law of large
numbers, probability distributions can yield probabilities that are close to
certainty. One way for this to happen is for the probability distribution for
some quantity to be tightly focussed on the expectation value of that quan-
tity, so that non-negligible deviations of the quantity from its expectation
value have negligible probability. When this holds, we may treat the quan-
tity as if it is certain to be equal to its expectation value, and use the actual
value and the expectation value interchangeably in our calculations.
Call the regime in which assertions can be made, on the basis of statistical
mechanics, about the value of the value of some quantity, with a degree of
probability that departs only negligibly from complete certainty, the quasi-
deterministic regime. It is in the quasi-deterministic regime that we will
recover the laws of thermodynamics.
As the zeroth law and second law are presuppositions of the definitions
of temperature and thermodynamic entropy, respectively, these quantities
will be undefined outside the quasi-deterministic regime. Given probabilistic
analogues of the laws of thermodynamics, there may be quantities, well-
defined even outside the quasi-deterministic regime, that play roles in the
probabilistic analogues of the laws of thermodynamics that are analogous to
the roles of temperature and entropy in the original versions of those laws,
and which, in the quasi-deterministic regime, have values that with near
certainty are near to the values of their thermodynamic counterparts. In
4It is common to express the relations between theories in terms of limiting relations.
I have expressed the relation, not in terms of limits, but in terms of approximation within
a certain regime, because it is not essential that one be able to obtain one theory from the
other by taking a limit as some parameter or parameters approach limiting values.
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section 3, below, probabilistic analogues of the laws of thermodynamics will
be presented, which are obtained from the original versions of the laws of
thermodynamics by replacing talk of energy exchanges, unqualified by prob-
abilistic considerations, with talk of expectation values of energy exchanges,
and which invoke quantities that bear the relations to expectation values of
energy exchanges that thermodynamic temperature and entropy bear to ac-
tual energy exchanges. Inevitably, since expectation values are attributes of
probability distributions, the statistical mechanical analogues of temperature
and entropy invoked will also be attributes of probability distributions.
The fact that statistical mechanical analogues of temperature and entropy
are introduced that, unlike their thermodynamic counterparts, are attributes
of probability distributions rather than of the physical states of systems, has
given rise to some confusion. It might appear that we have changed the sub-
ject, and are no longer talking about individual physical systems but about
ensembles of them, or that we are treating the probability distributions as
representing the physical states of systems.5 The reader will, I hope, be
relieved to be assured that none of this is true. The subject matter is still in-
dividual physical systems and their properties. The shift that has been made
is that, instead of making unqualified statements about the physical states
of individual systems, we are making probabilistically qualified statements
about them.
Nonetheless, the fact that statistical mechanical analogues of temperature
and entropy are attributes, not of mechanical states of physical systems,
but of probability distributions over mechanical states, is one that might
seem surprising. One might antecedently have expected to find mechanical
analogues of temperature and entropy, that is, quantities defined in terms of
the physical properties of a system. An objection to this move that is often
made is that, unlike the attributes of probability distributions that are the
statistical mechanical analogues of temperature and entropy, thermodynamic
temperature and entropy are measurable properties of a system. And this is
true — in the quasi-deterministic regime! Outside of this regime, repetitions
of a procedure we think of as a measurement of temperature (or entropy)
will not yield a consistent value, but, rather, a distribution of values, and it
makes no sense to talk of the value yielded by the procedure.
5This tendency is exacerbated somewhat by the fact that sometimes terminology is
employed that has the potential to mislead, in that one talks of saying that probability
distributions representing physical systems.
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A quantity that has been regarded as a statistical mechanical analogue
of entropy is the Boltzmann entropy, a generalization of the quantity H used
by Boltzmann in his studies of the relaxation of a gas to equilibrium. In
the quasi-deterministic regime, the difference between the Boltzmann en-
tropies of two equilibrium states will generally approximate the difference
between their thermodynamic entropies. Outside the quasi-deterministic
regime, Boltzmann entropy does not enter into any useful analogue of the
second law of thermodynamics. This is, of course, not to say that it isn’t
suited to the purpose for which it was introduced — as a quantity useful for
tracking relaxation to equilibrium of an isolated system.6
I have been talking about the relation between thermodynamics and sta-
tistical mechanics, without commitment to whether that relation is one of
reduction. Once one gets clear about the relation between thermodynamics
and statistical mechanics, and how analogues of the laws of thermodynam-
ics are obtained from statistical mechanics, the answer to the question of
whether the relation is one of “reduction” depends, of course, on what is to
count as a reduction. I will not, in this note, go into the matter of whether
the relation between thermodynamics fits any of the models of reduction
extant in the literature. It is almost a truism that the relation of ther-
modynamics to statistical mechanics is a relation of reduction if anything
is. If one accepts that conditional — and it is by no means obvious that
one should — and if one finds that the relation between thermodynamics
and statistical mechanics doesn’t satisfy one’s favoured model of reduction,
there are, of course, two possible responses to this situation. One would be
to modify one’s model of reduction, to accommodate the relation between
thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. The other would be to draw an
anti-reductionist moral.
6There is a tendency to conflate the second law of thermodynamics with the statement
that systems, left to themselves, tend to relax to a state of equilibrium, a statement that
Brown and Uffink (2001) have called theminus first law. This conflation should be resisted.
The tendency to conflate the two is encouraged by a tendency to treat the second law as
a statement about the behaviour of isolated systems, to the effect that the entropy of an
isolated system cannot decrease. This is a consequence of the second law, but it cannot be
a statement of it, as the second law is a presupposition of the definition of thermodynamic
entropy.
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2 The laws of thermodynamics
The laws of thermodynamics with which we will be concerned are three: the
zeroth law, the first law, and the second law. There is also a third law of
thermodynamics, but it will not concern us today.
There is also another proposition that has been called a law of thermo-
dynamics. This is what Brown and Uffink (2001) have called the minus first
law, or equilibrium principle. It states that an isolated system in a confined
space will eventually relax to an equilibrium state that is a function only of its
internal energy, the external constraints (such as confinement to a container)
imposed on it, and any external fields applied to it (such as gravitational or
magnetic fields). Explanation of the tendency of systems to equilibrate has,
understandably, been a major focus of the philosophical literature on the
relations between statistical mechanics and thermodynamics, and our under-
standing of those relations is not complete until we have an explanation of
that tendency. However, there are principled reasons for not counting the
equilibrium principle as a law of thermodynamics.7 The equilibrium princi-
ple, unlike the zeroth, first, and second laws, can be formulated without the
distinction that is at the core of thermodynamics, between energy transfer
as work and as heat. Thermodynamics presumes that systems do tend to
equilibrate when left to themselves, but this can profitably be regarded as
a presupposition of thermodynamics, rather than part of its subject matter.
Statistical mechanics should, of course, take as part of its task to explain why
we might be justified in supposing this, but this can be regarded as a task
distinct from that of obtaining analogues of the laws of thermodynamics.8
2.0 The zeroth law
The zeroth law has to do with relations between systems that are in thermal
equilibrium and have been placed in thermal contact with each other. It thus
presupposes that we understand what it means for a system to be in thermal
equilibrium, and what it means for two systems to be in thermal contact
— that is, to be in a situation that permits heat flow between the systems.
7And, as a matter of historical fact, though something of the sort was long explicitly
recognized as an important principle, it was not counted by anyone as a law of ther-
modynamics until the 1960s, more than a century after Kelvin initiated talk of laws, or
fundamental principles, of thermodynamics.
8See Myrvold (2020a) for further discussion of this point.
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When two systems are placed in thermal contact, there may be heat flow from
one to the other, or there may be none. The matter of whether or not there
will be heat flow, and, if there is, in which direction, is a relation between the
thermodynamic states of the systems. We’re interested in the case in which
there is no heat flow when the bodies are placed in thermal contact. This
relation between themodynamic states is obviously a symmetric one. The
zeroth law says that it is transitive.
The zeroth law of thermodynamics, version I. If a and
b are two thermodynamic states such that, if systems in these
states are brought into thermal contact, there is no net heat flow
between them, and if b and c are two thermodynamic states for
which this is also true, then the same holds for a and c.
If the zeroth law holds, then we can partition thermodynamic states into
equivalence classes, which we will regard as classes of states that all have the
same temperature. Therefore, another way of putting the zeroth law, which
we will take as our preferred expression of it, is the following.
The zeroth law of thermodynamics, version II. There is
a function T of thermodynamic states, such that, if systems in
state a and b are brought into thermal contact, there will be no
net heat flow between them if and only if T (a) = T (b).
2.1 The first law
Thermodynamics is based on the realization that there is a mechanical equiv-
alent of heat. That is, when work is expended to create heat, the same
amount of work is required to produce a given quantity of heat, regardless of
how this is done, and, when heat transfer is exploited to produce mechanical
work, the amount of heat that produces a given quantity of work is always
the same. It is this that permits us to speak of the total internal energy of a
system, which can be changed either by flow of heat in or out of the system,
or by mechanical means, by doing work on the system or having it do work
on some external system.
The first law of thermodynamics. There is a function U of
thermodynamic states, the internal energy of the system, such
that, in any process, the change in U is equal to the sum of the
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net heat that passes in or out of the system, and the net work
done on or by the system.
2.2 The second law
The second law has been stated in a variety of forms. One is the Clausius
version, which states that spontaneous flow of heat is from warmer to colder
bodies, and that, furthermore, there is no process that has no net effect other
than moving heat from a cooler to a warmer body. It follows from this that
there is an upper bound on the efficiency of any heat engine operating in a cy-
cle between two reservoirs (that is, work developed per unit of heat obtained
from the warmer reservoir). This permits the definition of an absolute tem-
perature scale. If η12 is the upper bound on efficiency of an engine operating
between two reservoirs, we can define the ratio of the absolute temperature
of the warmer, T1, to that of the cooler, T2 by,
T2
T1
= 1− η12. (1)
This permits us to formulate what we will take to be our preferred state-
ment of the second law of thermodynamics.
The second law of thermodynamics It is possible to choose
a temperature function (that is, a state function that takes equal
values on states of equal temperature) in such a way that there is a
function S of thermodynamic states of a system with the property
that, in any process that takes a system from a state a to state





If the states a and b can be connected reversibly — that is, if there is a
process that takes a to b, and another process that takes b to a with the
signs of the heat exchanges reversed — then the function S of which the
second law speaks is fixed up to an additive constant, and we can define








where the integral can be taken over any reversible process.
This also works if reversibility is unachievable but can be approached
arbitrarily closely; that is, if, for any ε > 0, there are processes that take a
to b and then b to a such that
∫
d̄ Q/T , taken over the full process, is less
than ε. We can then define Sθ(b)−Sθ(a) as the least upper bound of the set
of values of the integral of d̄ Q/T , taken over all processes.
It is the second law, together with the condition that any two thermo-
dynamic states can be connected reversibly or arbitrarily close to reversibly,
that permits the assignment of a unique entropy difference to any pair of
thermodynamic states. If the second law fails, there is no state-function that
bounds heat exchanges in the way demanded in our statement of the second
law. If reversibility fails, and if there are limits on how closely reversibil-
ity can be approximated, there will be a multitude of functions that fit the
bill. This will be important, later, for our discussion of statistical mechanical
analogues of thermodynamic entropy.
3 Statistical mechanical analogues of the laws
of thermodynamics
What has to change, once we acknowledge that the variables that we use to
characterize the thermal state of a system fall radically short of the full set
of variables potentially relevant to prediction of its behaviour?
First, and foremost, we must acknowledge that what the zeroth and sec-
ond laws say must happen, may be liable to exceptions, albeit ones that on
the macroscopic scale are almost sure to be insignificant. In this vein, we
find Maxwell, in a letter to John Strutt, Baron Rayleigh, of Dec. 6, 1870,
drawing the
Moral. The 2nd law of thermodynamics has the same degree of
truth as the statement that if you throw a tumblerful of water
into the sea, you cannot get the same tumblerful of water out
again. (Garber et al. 1995, p. 205; Harman 1995, p. 583).
Gibbs drew a similar conclusion, several years later.
when such gases have been mixed, there is no more impossibil-
ity of the separation of the two kinds of molecules in virtue of
their ordinary motions in the gaseous mass without any external
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influence, than there is of the separation of a homogeneous gas
into the same two parts into which it sas once been divided, after
these have once been mixed. In other words, the impossibility
of an uncompensated decrease of entropy seems to be reduced to
improbability (Gibbs 1875, p. 229, in Gibbs 1906, p. 167).
Maxwell elaborated on this point, in his review of Tait’s Sketch of Thermo-
dynamics.
If we restrict our attention to any one molecule of the system,
we shall find its motion changing at every encounter in a most
irregular manner.
If we go on to consider a finite number of molecules, even if the
system to which they belong contains an infinite number, the
average properties of this group, though subject to smaller vari-
ations than those of a single molecule, are still every now and
then deviating very considerably from the theoretical mean of
the whole system, because the molecules which form the group
do not submit their procedure as individuals to the laws which
prescribe the behaviour of the average or mean molecule.
Hence the second law of thermodynamics is continually being
violated, and that to a considerable extent, in any sufficiently
small group of molecules belonging to a real body. As the number
of molecules in the group is increased, the deviations from the
mean of the whole become smaller and less frequent; and when
the number is increased till the group includes a sensible portion
of the body, the probability of a measurable variation from the
mean occurring in a finite number of years becomes so small that
it may be regarded as practically an impossibility.
This calculation belongs of course to molecular theory and not
to pure thermodynamics, but it shows that we have reason for
believing the truth of the second law to be of the nature of a
strong probability, which, though it falls short of certainty by
less than any assignable quantity, is not an absolute certainty
(Maxwell 1878, p. 280; Niven 1890, pp. 670–71).
Boltzmann also acknowledged the point, in his response to Loschmidt, who
had drawn his attention to the fact that, because of the invariance of the
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laws of mechanics under the operation of velocity reversal, no temporally
asymmetric conclusion can be drawn from mechanical considerations alone.
Loschmidt’s theorem seems to me to be of the greatest impor-
tance, since it shows how intimately connected are the second
law and probability theory, whereas the first law is independent
of it. In all cases where
∫
dQ/T can be negative, there is also an
individual very improbable initial condition for which it may be
positive; and the proof that it is almost always positive can only
be carried out by means of probability theory (Boltzmann 1966,
p. 189, from Boltzmann 1877, in Boltzmann 1909, p. 121)
If we are to take these considerations seriously, we must incorporate prob-
abilistic considerations into our reasoning, and seek probabilistic counter-
parts to the zeroth and second laws, according to which what the original,
thermodynamic versions of these laws declare to be impossible, is at most
improbable.
Another change is a reconceptualization of equilibrium. Thermodynamic
equilibrium is, to the unaided eye, a state of tranquility. At the molecular
level it is, of course, seething with activity, and at a mesoscopic scale some
measurable variables fail to settle into a steady state. The best-known ex-
ample of this is, of course, Brownian motion, invisible to unaided eyes, but
visible with a microscope of modest power.
One could choose to say that a system of that sort, for which observable
parameters refuse to settle down to steady values, fails to equilibrate. But we
should not ignore the fact that a system like that, if disturbed, settles down
to a condition in which the observable parameters exhibit a regular pattern
of fluctuations, to which we can attach a well-defined probability distribu-
tion. For this reason, it makes sense to talk about an equilibrium distribution,
which is approached as a system equilibrates. Only in the quasi-deterministic
regime will the equilibrium distribution be such that the observable param-
eters take precise values (within the limits of observation), from which they
will with extremely high probability not depart appreciably on the time scales
of observation, and we can talk about an equilibrium state.9
9Thus, speaking of equilibrium distributions, as is done in “Gibbsian” statistical me-
chanics, and speaking of equilibrium states, as one does in “Boltzmannian” statistical
mechanics, does not reflect rival, incompatible conceptions of equilibrium; the latter is a
special case of the former.
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3.0 Statistical mechanical analogue of the zeroth law
Consider first, the zeroth law. When two systems at the same temperature
are placed in thermal contact, we expect that, on a sufficiently fine-grained
level, the energies of the two systems will not be strictly constant, but will
fluctuate. The zeroth law is, therefore, not quite right. But, on a macroscopic
scale, it will be close to being right. For two macroscopic bodies of the same
temperature in thermal contact with we expect the energy fluctuations of
each body to be minuscule compared to the total energy of the body, and,
furthermore, that the energy flow will go either way, with no net tendency in
either direction, and that the average energy exchange, over any sufficiently
long time period, will almost certainly be close to zero.
This suggests, of course, that the zeroth law be replaced with a probabilis-
tic version, and that, rather than attempting to make unqualified statements
about what will happen when two systems are brought into thermal con-
tact, we make probabilistically qualified statements. The version that we
will adopt will, in fact, refer to expectation values of energy exchanges.
The zeroth law has to do with systems that have relaxed to thermal
equilibrium. Given macroscopically available information, we will not be
able to make unqualified, categorical assertions about physical parameters
such as its energy, but we may be in a position to assign more or less definite
probabilities to ranges of values of those parameters. A family of probability
distributions that play a key role are the canonical distributions. These
are indexed by a parameter β. A canonical distribution with index β is
a probability distribution on the phase space of system that has a density
function with respect to Liouville measure,
τβ(x) = Zβ
−1 e−βH(x). (3)
A widely accepted postulate of statistical mechanics is the following.
The Canonical Postulate. For a system that has relaxed to
thermal equilibrium, a canonical distribution, uncorrelated with
the system’s environment, is appropriate for the purposes of mak-
ing probabilistic assertions about the values of macrovariables or
the system’s responses to manipulations of macrovariables.
It will usually not be expressed quite like this, but if one pays attention to
the uses made of canonical distributions, one will see that this, or something
much like it, is the assumption being made.
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The Canonical Postulate is the key to obtaining statistical mechanical
analogues of the laws of thermodynamics. Once we have it, the statistical
mechanical analogues of thermodynamical laws are relatively simple theo-
rems. The postulate is not, of course, the sort of thing that should simply be
accepted without good reason. Support for the Canonical Postulate comes
from a combination of empirical and theoretical considerations, some of which
involve investigation of the process of equilibration. In this note we will not
go into the reasons for accepting the Canonical Postulate, but will confine
ourselves to exploring its consequences.10
We will actually be needing only a weaker version; the only macrovariables
whose distributions we will need is the exchange of energy of the system with
bodies placed in thermal contact with it.
Thermal contact between two systems will be represented by a coupling
of the systems such that the contribution to the total internal energy of the
pair of systems due to the coupling is small compared to the internal energy
of each system, so that the total internal energy of the pair of systems is ap-
proximately equal to the sum of the internal energies of the two systems. We
also assume that a pair of systems can be thermally coupled and decoupled
without doing any work on the joint system, that is, without changing the
total energy of the pair of systems.
Canonical distributions have the following useful property, which is part
of the reason why they are thought to be appropriate for thermal states.
When two initially uncoupled systems with which are associated canonical
distributions with parameters βa and βb are allowed to interact in any way
whatsoever, with the proviso that in the process of coupling and decoupling
them no work is done on the joint system and the total energy is unchanged,
the direction of the expectation value of energy flow between the two systems
is determined solely by which of the parameters is larger, and is independent
of the details of the coupling It can also be shown that, under the same
conditions (which involve no work done on the joint system during the process
of coupling and decoupling), if the initial parameter values are the same, the
expectation value of energy exchange is zero.
Proposition 1. Suppose that, at time t0 two systems A and B have indepen-
dent canonical distributions τβa and τβb. Between time t0 and t1 they interact
with each other in such a way that the total energy of the pair of systems is
10See Maroney (2007) for an illuminating discussion of the rationale for the Canonical
Postulate.
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conserved. At t1 they are again no longer interacting. Let ⟨∆HA⟩ be the
expectation value of the energy change of system A (which is, of course, the
negative of ⟨∆HB⟩, the expectation value of the energy change of system B).
Then,
• If βa = βb, ⟨∆HA⟩ = 0,
• if βa > βb, ⟨∆HA⟩ ≥ 0, and
• if βa < βb, ⟨∆HA⟩ ≤ 0.






where k is a constant, called Boltzmann’s constant, which, as we will see in
section 4, is related to the constant R that appears in the ideal gas law via
Avogadro’s number. Then we can restate Proposition 1 as,
Proposition 2. Under the same conditions as in Proposition 1,
• If Ta = Tb, ⟨∆HA⟩ = 0,
• if Ta < Tb, ⟨∆HA⟩ ≥ 0, and
• if Ta > Tb, ⟨∆H=A⟩ ≤ 0.
The Canonical Postulate and Proposition 2 yield our statistical mechan-
ical analogue of the zeroth law of thermodynamics.
The zeroth law of thermodynamics, statistical mechani-
cal analogue. The class of probability distributions appropriate
to making probabilistic statements about macroscopic behaviour
of systems that have relaxed to thermal equilibrium is indexed
by a parameter T , such that, if two such systems, with which are
associated probability distributions for index-values Ta and Tb,
are brought into thermal contact with each other, the expectation
value of energy flow between the systems is zero if and only if
Ta = Tb.
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Compare this with the original, thermodynamic version of the second
law. The statistical mechanical version is obtained from the thermodynamic
version via the substitution of equilibrium probability distributions for ther-
modynamic states, and expectation values of energy flow for actual energy
flows. In the quasi-deterministic regime, in which expectation values of en-
ergy exchanges may be taken for the actual values, we recover the original
version. But the statistical mechanical version holds even when energy fluc-
tuations are large, so that the actual value of energy flow need not be even
probably close to its expectation value.
3.1 Statistical mechanics and the first law
Once we have settled on how to distinguish between energy transfer as work
and energy transfer as heat, the first law of thermodynamics is just a state-
ment of the conservation of energy. The concept of energy, unlike the con-
cepts of temperature and entropy, is a concept that belongs to the underlying
mechanics, and its conservation a consequence of the microphysical laws.
Though energy is a concept of the underlying mechanics, the distinction
between work and heat is not. This raises the question of how to distinguish
between work and heat, in the context of statistical mechanics.
The standard answer goes as follows. Some of the variables that define the
state of a system are treated as exogenous, manipulable variables.11 Energy
changes to the system via manipulation of these variables are to be counted
as work; energy changes via interactions with a heat reservoir, as heat.12
To get a feeling for how this works, consider a system in contact with
a heat reservoir. The total Hamiltonian of the joint system, consisting of
the system under consideration and the heat reservoir, is a function of the
phase-space point of the combined system, and the exogenous parameters.
Suppose that at some time t0, the system is in thermal equilibrium with a
heat reservoir with parameter βa, and is subject to external parameters λ =
{λ1, . . . , λn}. At t1 it is subject to parameters {λ1 + dλ1, . . . , λn + dλn} that
differ, if at all, by small amounts from their original values, and is in thermal
equilibrium with a heat bath with parameter β = β+dβ. In accordance with
the Canonical Postulate, we use canonical distributions with the respective
11See Myrvold (2020b) for discussion of what this entails.
12The astute reader will have noticed that this need not be an exhaustive partition. This
is correct. For the purposes of this note, however, we will confine ourselves to situations
in which there are no other sorts of interaction between the system and its environment.
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parameters to calculate probabilities for properties of the system at each of
these times. It is not difficult to show that the expectation value of the
change in total energy of the system, between times t0 and t1, is,








where H is the Hamiltonian (total energy) function of the system, and ρ is
a probability density with respect to Liouville measure. The second term on
the right-hand-side of (5) is the expectation value of work done in changing
the external parameters; the first term is, therefore, the expectation value
of heat exchanged with the reservoir. Thus, we have up to first order in
parameter differences,
⟨d̄ Q⟩ = −kT d⟨log ρ⟩. (6)
3.2 Statistical mechanical analogue of the second law
The original version of the second law places limits on the efficiency with
which a heat engine operating in a cycle between two reservoirs, at temper-
atures T1 and T2, can operate. If Q1 is the heat obtained from the hotter
reservoir, at temperature T1, and W is the work obtained in a cycle, it follows







This is the Carnot bound on the efficiency of heat engines.
Because of fluctuations in the energy transferred, (7) might not hold, on
a given run of the engine. We might get more work than the Carnot bound
allows. Over the years various schemes have been proposed that are meant to
exploit molecular-scale fluctuations to create a perpetual motion machine of
the second kind, which could operate in a cycle between two heat reservoirs
to consistently and reliably exceed the Carnot bound on efficiency. These all
fall afoul of the unpredictability of fluctuations. Though, on one occasion,
we might get more work in a cycle than allowed by the Carnot bound, we
also might get less. The question is whether we can expect to get more, on
average, work than permitted by the Carnot bound.
One thing we might expect from a statistical mechanical version of the
second law would be a probabilistic statement to the effect that no engine can
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consistently and reliably violate the Carnot bound. Szilard compared with
this with no-go theorems for gambling schemes that seek to consistently and
reliably beat the odds at a casino.
Consider somebody playing a thermodynamical gamble with the
help of cyclic processes and with the intention of decreasing the
entropy of the heat reservoirs. Nature will deal with him like a
well established casino, in which it is possible to make an occa-
sional win but for which no system exists ensuring the gambler a
profit (Szilard 1972, p. 73, from Szilard 1925, p. 757).
This suggests that we might be able to obtain a probabilistic version of the
second law that yields a Carnot bound on expectation value of work obtained.







And, indeed, if one accepts the Canonical Postulate, which tells us what
probability distributions are appropriate for heat reservoirs, we get just that.
Statistical second law of thermodynamics
a. Classical. There is a functional S of probability distributions,
such that: If a system A that, at time t0, has associated with it a
probability distribution ρA(t0), interacts in the interval between
t0 and t1 with heat reservoirs Bi that, at t0, have canonical dis-
tributions τβi , uncorrelated with A, then the expectation value of





b. Quantum. The same, with quantum states replacing probabil-
ity distributions.
The reader should take a moment to verify that this does, indeed, entail the
probabilistic version of the Carnot bound, inequality (8).
If ρA(t1) and ρA(t0) can be connected reversibly — that is, if there is some
process that takes ρA(t1) back to ρA(t0), in the course of which there are heat
exchanges with the heat reservoirs whose expectation values are those of the
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process that takes ρA(t0) to ρA(t1), with signs reversed — then the functional
S of which the statistical second law speaks is uniquely determined, up to
an additive constant. If there are bounds on how closely reversibility can be
approached, there will be a plethora of such functionals, whose differences
are not constant.
The statistical second law is a theorem of statistical mechanics. It depends
on associating canonical distributions with the heat reservoirs, but there is
no assumption about the initial probability distribution for A, ρA(t0), other
than that the state of A is uncorrelated with that of the heat reservoirs.
The statistical second law follows from what I have elsewhere called the
Fundamental Theorem of Statistical Thermodynamics (see Myrvold 2020b,
2021b).
Proposition 3. a. Classical. Consider a system A that, at time t0, has
associated with it a probability distribution ρA(t0) that has a density fρ with
respect to Liouville measure. In the interval between t0 and t1 it interacts with
heat reservoirs Bi that, at t0, have canonical distributions τβi, uncorrelated
with A. Then the expectation value of heat exchanges Qi between A and the





where SG is the “Gibbs entropy,”
SG[ρ] = −k⟨log fρ⟩ρ.
b. Quantum. The same, with a quantum state represented by a density
operator ρ̂ replacing the probability distribution, and with the functional being
the von Neumann entropy,
SvN [ρ̂] = −k⟨log ρ̂⟩ρ.
Proof is found in the Appendix.
3.3 Thermodynamically equivalent distributions, and
coarse-grained entropies
Consider the familiar example of free expansion of a gas composed of macro-
scopically many molecules. At time t0, the gas is confined to one side of a
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container by a partition. The partition is removed, and the gas is allowed to
diffuse throughout the container. Let t1 be some time after the removal of
the partition, long enough that the gas has had ample time to equilibrate.
For illustrative purposes, we consider a wholly fictitious situation in which
the gas undergoes isolated evolution during this time, free from any external
influences.
We expect that the gas, at t1, will be fairly evenly distributed throughout
the box. That is, if we partition the box into subvolumes, which may be
small compared to the total volume of the box but must be large enough
to contain a great many molecules, we will expect the amount of gas in
each subvolume to be approximately proportional to its volume. Because
the gas undergoes isolated evolution, its energy at the end of the process is
the same as it is at the beginning. If the gas is sufficiently rarified that its
behaviour approximates that of an ideal gas, to which Joule’s law applies,
the temperature is a function only of its internal energy, and is the same at
the beginning and end of the process. For simplicity, we will assume that
this is the case in the discussion that follows.
Let us ask: is the entropy at the end of the process higher, lower, or
the same as at the beginning? To answer this question, thermodynamics
requires us to answer the question of whether the process of free expansion,
during which the gas exchanges no energy with the external world, is to be
counted as a reversible process or not. If there were a device that could
instantaneously reverse the velocities of all the molecules in the gas, with no
other effect on the gas, and without expenditure of work, then the process
would be reversible, and we would have to count the initial and final states
as having the same thermodynamic entropy.13
There is no such device, of course, and free expansion of a gas is not even
close to being reversible. A process that is close to reversible is a process
of gradual expansion of the gas against a piston that at each moment exerts
a force on the gas that is approximately equal to the force exerted by the
pressure of the gas on the piston, during the course of which the gas is kept
at constant temperature by thermal contact with a heat bath. As the gas
does work on the piston, imparting energy to it, it absorbs compensating
quantities of heat from the heat bath. There is in the course of this process
a positive net influx of heat into the gas, and, therefore, a positive change of
13If this remark is surprising to you, then review the definition of thermodynamic en-
tropy, as this is an immediate consequence of that definition.
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entropy, and the final entropy is higher than the initial entropy.
This leads to the conclusion that the final state of a gas that undergoes
a gradual expansion of this sort is a state of higher entropy than the initial
state? But what implications does this have for the final state of a gas
undergoing free expansion, while isolated from its environment?
The answer is, of course, that we count the final states of these two very
different processes as instances of the same thermodynamic state, and ipso
facto assign the same entropy to the end state, regardless of which process
leads up to it. The rationale for this lies in the expectation that the pro-
cess of equilibration that the gas undergoes during free expansion effectively
effaces all traces of its recent past, and that, as far as measurements of
macroscopically accessible quantities, and the responses of the gas to feasi-
ble manipulations, are concerned, there is no difference between a gas that
has recently relaxed, via an irreversible process, from a far-from equilibrium
state, and a gas with the same volume and temperature that has been in
thermal contact with a heat bath for a protracted period of time. It is as if
the gas has drunk from the river Lethe and has forgotten its past (or rather,
has suppressed the memory, because, in the fictitious situation we are imag-
ining, of completely isolated evolution, the traces of the past remain, but are
embedded in details of the microstate that are macroscopically inaccessible).
This is a common assumption of thermodynamics, more often implicitly
invoked than made explicit. But let’s make the assumption explicit.
The Lethean postulate. As far as results of measurements
of macroscopically accessible quantities are concerned, and re-
sponses to feasible manipulations, a system that has recently
relaxed to equilibrium in isolation from its environment is in-
distinguishable from a system with the same values of external
constraints (such as volume), and same temperature, that has
been in protracted thermal contact with a heat bath at that tem-
perature.
In what follows, we assume that the Lethean postulate is correct, and
explore its consequences for the question of statistical mechanical analogues
of thermodynamic entropy.
Let τβ,V0 be a canonical distribution for some temperature T = 1/(kβ)
over the portion of the container available to the gas at time t0, and let ρ(t1)
be the result of evolving this distribution, via the dynamics of the gas, from
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t0 to t1. Let τβ,V1 be a canonical distribution, with the same temperature,
over the volume of the container available to the gas at t1.
These two probability distributions ρ(t1) and τβ,V1 will be similar in some
respects, and very different in others. Because the evolution from t0 to t1
conserves energy, they will agree on the distribution of energy; that is, they
will agree not only on the mean value of energy, but also on the extent of
the spread in energy. They will also agree closely on probabilities regarding
the amount of gas to be found in any subregion of the box; both will accord
high probability to the gas being spread fairly evenly throughout the box,
with the amount of gas in any not-too-small subvolume proportional to its
volume. In fact, they will agree very nearly on the probability distribution
of any macroscopically measurable parameter.
They will disagree on other matters. ρ(t1) has support on the set of states
that can be reached, in the course of isolated evolution, from the set of states
accessible at t0. This is a set that is accorded probability 1 by ρ(t1) and very
small probability, of the order (V0/V1)
N , where N is the number of molecules
in the gas, by τβ,V1 . This set is very finely distributed throughout the region
of phase space available at t1. Thus, ρ(t1), unlike τβ,V1 , sharply distinguishes
between some sets of phase space that differ in ways that are invisible to
macroscopic scrutiny.
Suppose that, after time t1, we want to restore the system that has been
allowed to relax to equilibrium while isolated from its surroundings to a state
in which it is at its original temperature, is confined to its original volume
and is in contact with a heat bath at that temperature. We have available
to us various heat reservoirs, at temperatures Ti, and we want to invoke
the statistical-mechanical analogue of the second law to place bounds on
expectation values ⟨Qi⟩ of heat exchange with these reservoirs in the course
of the transition. The statistical second law tells that, no matter how we




≤ S[τβ,V0 ]− S[ρ(t1)]. (9)
There’s a wrinkle, however. Because ρ(t1) is obtained from τβ,V0 via isolated







This is correct, but is consistent with the quantity on the left-hand side
being zero, or arbitrarily close to zero. We know, however, that, in order to
compress the gas to its original volume without changing from temperature,
some heat must be expelled from the gas.
If, as we believe, the Lethean Postulate is correct, we can do better, and
achieve a tighter bound. If the Lethean postulate is correct, the fine-grained
details of ρ(t1) are irrelevant to expectation values of heat exchanges over
the course of any process due to manipulations of macroscopic variables, and
these expectation values are the same whether calculated with respect to
ρ(t1) or τβ,V1 , and so we can conclude that, over the course of any process





≤ S[τβ,V0 ]− S[τβ,V1 ] = −kN log(V1/V0), (11)
which is a much better bound!
This is an illustration of the remark made earlier, about the uniqueness
(up to an additive constant) or lack thereof of entropy functions. If any two
thermodynamic states can be connected reversibly, the state-function whose
existence is asserted in the second law is uniquely determined, up to an
arbitrary constant. If there are states that cannot be connected reversibly,
then there will be more than one function that plays the role of placing
bounds on heat exchanges. This is one such case. There is no process of
macroscopic manipulation that takes the probability distribution ρ(t1) back
to ρ(t0) without expenditure of work. Such a process would have to exploit
the fine-grained differences between ρ(t1) and τβ,V1 , and would have to be
something akin to a magical reversal of all the velocities of the gas molecules.
Thus, the process of expansion does not count as reversible, and we are in a
situation in which the second law does not uniquely determine a function S
that bounds the expectation values of heat exchanges. When such a variety
of bounds exist, the bound of most interest is the strongest bound, which
entails all the others.14
The probability distribution τβ,V1 is a “smoothing” of ρ(t1), in the sense
that they agree on probability distributions of macroscopically ascertainable
variables, but ρ(t1) makes discriminations between macroscopically indistin-
guishable microstates that τβ,V1 doesn’t, as τβ,V1 has a density function that
14For a systematic discussion of how to do thermodynamics and statistical thermody-
namics without reversibility, see Myrvold (2020b).
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is a function only of macrovariables. Let us generalize this smoothing opera-
tion. Given a set {F1, . . . , Fn} of macrovariables, let us say that a probability
distribution ρ is a smoothing (or coarse-graining) of a distribution ρ, with
respect to these macrovariables, if ρ̄ agrees with ρ on distributions for values
of the macrovariables {F1, . . . , Fn}, and ρ̄ has a density function that is a
function only of the variables {F1, . . . , Fn}.
Let us say that two probability distributions are thermodynamically equiv-
alent if they agree on probability distributions of all macroscopically acces-
sible variables and also agree on the expectation values of heat exchanges
with any heat baths that result from macroscopic manipulations. Then one
way to express the Lethean postulate is that any probability distribution is
thermodynamically equivalent to its smoothing ρ̄ with respect to all relevant
macrovariables.
Armed with this, we get the following strengthening of our Fundamental
Theorem.
Proposition 4. a. Classical. Suppose a system A, has associated with it
at time t0 a probability distribution ρA(t0) that has a density fρ with respect
to Liouville measure. In the interval between t0 and t1 it interacts with heat
reservoirs Bi that, at t0, have canonical distributions τβi, uncorrelated with
A. If ρA(t0) is thermodynamically equivalent to ρ̄A(t0), then the expectation





where, again, SG is the “Gibbs entropy.”
b. Quantum. Same, but with quantum states and von Neumann entropy.
A common refrain of polemics directed against “Gibbsian” methods is
that, for a system that equilibrates in isolation from its environment, the
fine-grained Gibbs entropy fails to represent the difference in thermodynamic
entropy between initial and final states. This is correct; it does not. This
would count as an objection to anyone who has claimed that it does, but one
may search the literature in vain for a claim of that sort. It is also commonly
said that invocation of coarse-grained Gibbs entropies is unmotivated. I hope
that the above discussion has made it clear that this is simply and plainly
false. We set out to look for an analogue, in statistical mechanical terms, of
the second law of thermodynamics, that places bounds on expectation values
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of heat exchanges in terms of some functional of probability distributions.
If two probabilistic “states” can be connected reversibly, the requirements
imposed by the theorem determine, up to an additive constant, what that
functional is. In the absence of reversibility, more than one functional takes
this role, but the strongest bound is the one of most interest, and entails all
of the others. If the Lethean postulate holds, we will, whenever the coarse-
grained and fine-grained entropies of the initial probability distribution differ,
obtain a stronger bound if we invoke coarse-grained entropy.
4 Measured values of temperature and en-
tropy
A question that has undoubtedly formed in the reader’s mind is: what is the
relation between the attributes of probability distributions, introduced in the
previous section, and macroscopically measurable values of temperature and
entropy? The answer has to do with the quasi-deterministic regime.
Let us consider the case of temperature, first. The simplest thermometer
to analyze is a constant pressure ideal gas thermometer. Take a monatomic
ideal gas consisting of N molecules, enclosed in a container whose volume can
change (for simplicity, one might imagine a cylinder with a movable piston),
whose expansion is resisted by a constant pressure p on the outside of the
container. The volume is taken as an indicator of temperature, via the ideal
gas law,
pV = nRT, (12)
where R is the ideal gas constant, and n is the number of moles of gas
contained in the thermometer, that is, the number of molecules, N , divided
by Avogadro’s number, NA. So, if we put the thermometer in thermal contact
with some body, and allow the joint system to equilibrate, the temperature








Suppose the thermometer is placed in thermal contact with some object.
The joint system is allowed to equilibrate. In accordance with the Canon-
ical Postulate, it will settle into a condition in which the two systems are
exchanging quantities of energy and the energy of each separate system is
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a fluctuating quantity with probabilities given by a canonical distribution
for the joint system, with some parameter β. This gives us a probability
distribution for the volume, V , and, hence, a probability distribution for the
measured temperature, Tmeas.
For our gas thermometer, a canonical distribution with parameter β yields
a probability distribution for the volume V with expectation value ⟨V ⟩ that
satisfies,
p ⟨V ⟩ = N + 1
β
, (14)





Therefore, for a macroscopic gas thermometer containing a number of molecules
on the order of Avogadro’s number, the spread in the probability distribution
for V is of negligible size, compared to typical values of V . We are thus in the
quasi-deterministic regime, and one may take the expectation value as the
value that will almost certainly be obtained. The same holds, of course, for
the measured temperature, Tmeas; for a macroscopic thermometer, it has a
probability distribution tightly focussed around its expectation value ⟨Tmeas⟩.













Take k = R/NA. Recall that the temperature T was related to the parameter














Thus, for large N , the temperature of an object, as measured by an ideal
gas thermometer, will almost certainly closely approximate the parameter T
invoked in the statistical version of the zeroth law.
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What about entropy? The difference in thermodynamic entropy between
two thermodynamic states, a and b, is calculated by considering some re-
versible process that links the state. Consider the statistical mechanical
treatment of a system whose temperature and external parameters are slowly
varied from (βa,λa) to (βb,λb), while the system is in thermal contact with
a heat bath whose temperature is also slowly varied. If the time-scale of the
change of parameters is slow compared to the equilibration time-scale of the
system, we may take the system to be effectively in equilibrium at each stage
of the process. According to the Canonical Postulate, we may use a family
of canonical distributions with varying parameters to calculate probabilities




= −k (⟨log ρb⟩b − ⟨log ρa⟩a)
= SG[τβb,λb ]− SG[τβa,λa ].
(19)
In the quasi-deterministic regime, actual energy exchanges will be close to
their expectation values, so the measured entropy difference will, with high
probability, be close to the difference in Gibbs entropies.
5 Boltzmann entropy and its relation to ther-
modynamic entropy
The quantity that has come to be called “Boltzmann entropy” is defined as
follows. One chooses a number of functions on phase space {F1, . . . , Fn}, to
be regarded as macrovariables. One then coarse-grains the ranges of these
macrovariables, into intervals small enough that all values within the interval
can be consider effectively the same, on a macroscopic scale. This gives a
partitioning of the phase space of the system into coarse-grained macrostates.
Typically one of the macrovariables is energy. Partitioning the range of
possible energies divides the phase space of the system into “energy shells,”
consisting of a narrow band of energies, each of which is partitioned by the
coarse-graining of the other macrovariables into macrostates. Let M(x) be
the element of the macrostate partition to which a phase-space point belongs,
and let µ be Liouville measure on phase space. Then the Boltzmann entropy
of a microstate x is defined as,
SB(x) = k log µ(M(x)). (20)
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The connection between Boltzmann entropy and thermodynamic entropy
is via Gibbs entropy. As we have seen in the previous section, in the quasi-
deterministic regime, measured differences in thermodynamic entropy are,
with high probability, approximately equal to Gibbs entropy differences. As
we will now argue, in that regime Boltzmann entropy differences are ap-
proximately equal to Gibbs entropy differences. Therefore, in the quasi-
deterministic regime, Boltzmann entropy differences are approximately equal
to thermodynamic entropy differences.15
Consider some Boltzmannian energy shell ΓE. Let ΓE(λa) and ΓE(λb)
be the subsets of ΓE that are compatible with those values of the external
parameters. In the quasi-deterministic regime, we expect each ΓE(λ) to be
dominated by a single macrostate, ME(λ), which takes up the vast majority
of its Liouville measure. Therefore, in the quasi-deterministic regime,
SB(λb)− SB(λa) = k log (µ(ME(λb)/µ(ME(λa)))
≈ k log (µ(ΓE(λb)/µ(ΓE(λa)))
(21)
In the quasi-deterministic regime, a canonical distribution is sharply peaked
near its expectation value. If τβ,λa and τβ,λb are both peaked around a com-
mon energy expectation value E, with the same spread in energy, and if ΓE
is an energy shell focused on E, with a width comparable to the spread of
energy of those canonical distributions,
S[τβ,λb ]− S[τβ,λa ] ≈ k log (µ(ΓE(λb))/µ(ΓE(λa))) . (22)
Therefore, in this regime, the difference of the Boltzmann entropies SB(λb)
and SB(λa) will approximate the difference of thermodynamic entropy of the
corresponding thermodynamic states.
6 Foundations and keystones: on the relation
between “Boltzmannian” and “Gibbsian”
methods
It has become a commonplace of the philosophical literature on statistical
mechanics that there are rival approaches to statistical mechanics, usually
15See Werndl and Frigg (2020b) for a detailed discussion of conditions under which
Boltzmann entropy differences agree with Gibbs energy differences.
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called “Boltzmannian” and “Gibbsian.” The terminology is unfortunate, as
both have their roots in the work of Boltzmann, and, in particular, the use
of an imaginary ensemble of systems, usually thought to be a hallmark of the
“Gibbsian” approach, was originated by Boltzmann. Sometimes, the contrast
is expressed as one between “individualist” and “ensemblist” approaches (see
Goldstein 2019). This is also misleading, as the point of introducing ensem-
bles is to consider the consequences of an incomplete specification of initial
conditions for the behaviour of an individual system.
The idea that the families of methods labelled “Boltzmannian” and “Gibb-
sian” constitute incompatible and competing approaches is alien to the way
the founders of the subject thought of it, and to the textbook tradition that
emerged.16 Though Boltzmann’s work on statistical mechanics, which in-
volves a bewildering variety of approaches, might give the impression that
he is merely opportunistic and systematic, a careful reading, undertaken by
Olivier Darrigol, demonstrates that Boltzmann was deeply concerned with
the relations between the various techniques he introduced (Darrigol, 2018).
Gibbs himself presented his work, not as a rival to Boltzmann’s, but as ex-
tending and building upon it.
Another attitude that has been expressed in the literature is that “Boltz-
mannian” statistical mechanics forms a foundation for the subject, and “Gibb-
sian” methods are to be thought of as calculational tools, and nothing more
(see Goldstein et al. 2020; Werndl and Frigg 2020a).
Einstein, who, independently of Gibbs, developed much of the machinery
of “Gibbsian” statistical mechanics, saw the relation of that machinery to the
work of Boltzmann differently. In a letter to Marcel Grossman of September
1901, he wrote,17
Lately I have been engrossed in Boltzmann’s works on the kinetic
theory of gases and these last few days I wrote a short paper
16Here’s a way to think of it, that I find helpful. Is Boltzmann’s Lectures on Gas
Theory (Boltzmann 1896, 1898, 1964) a work of “Boltzmannian” or “Gibbsian” statistical
mechanics? The H-theorem, usually awarded to the “Boltzmannian” camp, is there, in
Boltzmann’s fullest presentation. But so are the ensembles of systems (which Boltzmann
called Ergoden); see especially sections 26 and 32 of Part II. Is it possible to divide these
lectures into two treatises, a “Boltzmannian” and “Gibbsian” one, each capable of standing
on its own?
17Ich habe mich in letzer Zeit gründlich mit Boltzmanns Arbeiten über kinetische Gas-
theorie befaßt & in den letzen Tagen selbst eine kleine Arbeit geschreiben, welche den
Schlußstein einer von ihm begonnen Beweiskette liefert.
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myself that provides the keystone in the chain of proofs that he
had started (Einstein 1987b, p. 181, from Einstein 1987a, p.
315).
We have here two architectural metaphors, foundation and keystone. The
two metaphors convey very different conceptions of the relation between
“Boltzmannian” and “Gibbsian” methods in statistical mechanics. The re-
lation of a foundation to the structure built on it is one of asymmetric de-
pendence. The foundation does not need the superstructure for its stability,
but the superstructure cannot stand without the foundation. In contrast,
an arch is not stable until the keystone is in place, and must be held up by
temporary scaffolding. Once the arch is completed, no part of it can stand on
its own, without the other parts. It is, of course, possible that Einstein was
Figure 1: Parts of an arch.
simply wrong about the relation of his work (and Gibbs’) to Boltzmann’s.
But I invite the reader to seriously consider the possibility that Einstein and
Gibbs, both of them deeply immersed in study of Boltzmann’s work on sta-
tistical mechanics, correctly understood the relation of their work to that of
their predecessor.
7 Appendix. Proofs
As we have seen, the theorems invoked in this note come in two version,
quantum and classical. In this appendix, we will adopt systematically am-
biguous notation, and use the notation ρ for either a probability distribution
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on a classical phase space, represented by density function fρ with respect
to Liouville measure, or a quantum state, represented by a density operator
ρ̂ on a Hilbert space. We will use the notation S[ρ] for the Gibbs entropy
(classical), or the von Neumann entropy (quantum). We will occasionally use
S(t) as shorthand for S applied to the probability distribution (or quantum
state) for time t. By Hamiltonian evolution we will mean, in the classical
context, evolution of a system according to Hamilton’s equations, for some
(possibly time-varying) Hamiltonian H, and, in the classical context, evo-
lution of a quantum state according to the Schrödinger equation, for some
(possibly time-varying) Hamiltonian operator Ĥ. The key feature of Hamil-
tonian evolution that we need is that, in the classical context, it conserves
Liouville measure, and, in the quantum context, it induces a unitary mapping
of the Hilbert space to itself.
As mentioned in the main text, for a Hamiltonian Hλ, which may depend
on exogenous parameters λ, a canonical distribution is one that has a density





Zβ,λ is a normalization constant, required to make the integral of τβ,λ over




It depends on the parameter β and on the form of the Hamiltonian Hλ. In
fact, this dependence is informative about certain properties of the canonical
distribution. In particular, the dependence of Zβ,λ on β yields information













Because the variance of H is always positive, for any canonical distribution,
it follows that, for fixed λ, expectation value of energy for the canonical
distribution, ⟨Hλ⟩τβ,λ , is a monotonic decreasing function of β, that is, a
monotonic increasing function of temperature. From this it follows that, for
32
fixed λ, no two distinct canonical distributions have the same expectation
value of energy.
A useful property of canonical distributions is the following.
Lemma 1. For any T > 0, the canonical distribution τβ, where β = 1/kT ,
uniquely minimizes the quantity
⟨H⟩ρ − TS[ρ].
That is, for any distribution ρ,
⟨H⟩τβ − TS[τβ] ≤ ⟨H⟩ρ − TS[ρ],
with equality only if ρ = τβ.
To prove Lemma 1, we define the relative entropy of two probability
distributions. If two distributions have density functions ρ, ω, such that ρ is
equal to zero wherever ω is, we define their relative entropy (also known as
the Kullback-Leibler divergence), as
S[ρ ∥ω] = −k ( ⟨logω⟩ρ − ⟨log ρ⟩ρ) . (27)
It can be proven (see, e.g., Cover and Thomas 1991, §2.6) that S[ρ ∥ω] ≥ 0,
with equality only if ρ = ω. From this Lemma 1 follows, taking τβ as ω.
From Lemma 1, and the fact that ⟨Hλ⟩τβ,λ , is a monotonic decreasing
function of β, we have,
Lemma 2. The canonical distribution τβ,λ uniquely maximizes S among dis-
tributions that agree with it on expectation value of energy. That is, if
⟨Hλ⟩ρ = ⟨Hλ⟩τβ,λ ,
then
S[τβ,λ] ≥ S[ρ],
with equality only if ρ = τβ,λ.
We will also use the following facts about the Gibbs/von Neumann en-
tropy S.
Lemma 3. S[ρ] is conserved under Hamiltonian evolution.
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Lemma 4. (Subadditivity of S). For any system AB consisting of disjoint
subsystems A, B, and any probability distribution over AB,
S[ρAB] ≤ S[ρA] + S[ρB],
with equality only if the subsystems A and B are uncorrelated on ρ.
We are now in a position to prove what we set out to prove.
Proposition 5. Suppose that, at time t0, two systems A and B have associ-
ated with them uncorrelated canonical distributions with parameters βa and
βb. During the time interval [t0, t1], the joint system consisting of A and B
undergoes Hamiltonian evolution according to the time-varying Hamiltonian
HAB(t) = HA +HB + VAB(t),
where the interaction potential VAB is zero at the endpoints of this interval.
VAB(t0) = VAB(t1) = 0.
No restrictions are placed on VAB other than the condition that no net work
is done on the system.
⟨HA +HB⟩t0 = ⟨HA +HB⟩t1 .
Then,
• If βa = βb, ⟨∆HA⟩ = 0,
• if βa > βb, ⟨∆HA⟩ ≥ 0, and
• if βa < βb, ⟨∆HA⟩ ≤ 0.
Proof. We begin with the case βa = βb. Then the initial distribution for
the joint system AB is a canonical distribution. Because the evolution from
t0 to t1 is Hamiltonian, S has the same value at the beginning and end
of the evolution. The expectation value of total energy is the same at t1
as it is at t0. Since, by Lemma 2, the initial canonical distribution is the
unique distribution that has the values for S and ⟨H⟩ that it does, the final
distribution is the same as the initial canonical distribution.
Now consider the case in which βa ̸= βb. By Lemma 1,
⟨HA(t0)⟩ − Ta SA(t0) ≤ ⟨HA(t1)⟩ − Ta SA(t1), (28)
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or,
∆⟨HA⟩ ≥ Ta∆SA. (29)
Similarly,
∆⟨HB⟩ ≥ Tb∆SB. (30)
Because the subsystems A and B are uncorrelated at t0,
SAB(t0) = SA(t0) + SB(t0). (31)
By Lemma 4,
SAB(t1) ≤ SA(t1) + SB(t1). (32)
Because S is conserved under Hamiltonian evolution,
SAB(t1) = SAB(t0). (33)
Combining (31), (32), and (33), we get,
SA(t0) + SB(t0) ≤ SA(t1) + SB(t1), (34)
or,
∆SA +∆SB ≥ 0. (35)






≥ ∆SA +∆SB ≥ 0. (36)






∆⟨HA⟩ ≥ 0, (37)
or,
(βa − βb)∆⟨HA⟩ ≥ 0. (38)
From this follow the claimed assertions.
Proposition 6. Consider a system A that, at time t0, has a probability
distribution ρA(t0). Between t0 and t1 it interacts successively with systems
{Bi, i = 1, . . . , n}, which at t0 have canonical distributions at temperatures
Ti, uncorrelated with A. The joint system consisting of A and the systems
{Bi} undergoes Hamiltonian evolution in the interval, and the coupling of
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A with the systems {Bi} conserves total energy. At t1 the systems are no
longer interacting. Let ⟨Qi⟩ = −∆⟨HBi⟩ be the expectation value of the






Proof. By the same reasoning that led to (30), we have, for each Bi,




≥ ∆SBi . (40)














∆SBi ≥ 0. (42)














which is what was to be proven.
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